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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself as a patient. You go into the hospital for your 
annual physical examination with Dr. Mosley, and you ask him 
about an unusual mole that has formed on your abdomen. Dr. 
Mosley does a screening and within a short period of time 
diagnoses the mole as benign and tells you “not to worry about it.” 
You let out a sigh of relief and return to your regular life. About 
thirteen months later you attend your annual physical examination 
as scheduled, but this time with Dr. Shea because Dr. Mosley has 
retired. Dr. Shea analyzes your mole and after running a gamut of 
tests determines the mole is cancerous and has metastasized into 
Stage IV melanoma. You start treatment immediately, but the 
outlook is not promising. Your specialist determined that if Dr. 
Mosley had diagnosed your mole as cancerous a year earlier, you 
would have had Stage II melanoma with a seventy percent recovery 
rate. However, because of the late diagnosis, you instead face a 
bleak thirty percent chance of surviving your illness. This lapse of 
time equates to a forty percent difference in your chance of 
survival. 
Under the traditional principles of medical malpractice, you 
would be unable to prevail against Dr. Mosley for his misdiagnosis 
and your corresponding loss of chance, because you have less than 
a fifty percent chance of surviving your illness.1 For a patient to 
bring a successful medical malpractice claim, he or she must prove 
that the physician’s negligence more likely than not caused the 
injury.2 If a patient’s chance of survival has fallen below fifty 
percent, he or she is left unable to prove that the physician’s 
 
 1.  Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 1993) (holding an 
increased chance of recurrence of cancer and a decreased chance of survival were 
inactionable injuries). 
 2.  4A MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY 
INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CIVIL § 80.90 (5th ed. 2006). 
2
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negligence, and not the patient’s underlying disease, caused the 
patient’s injury or death.3 Thus, under the traditional malpractice 
rule, physicians were provided with a virtual shield when it came to 
patients with less than a fifty percent chance of survival.4 
The Minnesota Supreme Court sought to remedy these harsh 
and illogical results by establishing the loss of chance doctrine in 
Dickhoff v. Green.5 Through the adoption of this doctrine, the 
arbitrary distinction made between patients with more than a fifty 
percent chance of survival and patients with less than a fifty percent 
chance of survival was eliminated.6 Plaintiffs are now able to recover 
under the loss of chance doctrine so long as the defendant’s 
malpractice reduced the plaintiff’s chances of survival.7 
Despite the logical benefits of this doctrine, many questions 
remain unanswered regarding the practical application of the loss 
of chance doctrine. The Minnesota Supreme Court described loss 
of chance in broad terms and did not define what type of provider 
negligence constitutes a loss of chance claim.8 The scenarios for 
which a provider could be found liable under the loss of chance 
theory could include negligently diagnosing, referring, treating, 
prescribing, or similar actions, and there is speculation that the loss 
of chance doctrine may be expanded beyond the medical 
malpractice arena.9 Questions also remain regarding how damages 
will be calculated, how the jury will be instructed, and what 
implications may be in store for Frye-Mack challenges to experts’ 
quantifications of a patient’s loss of chance.10 The defense bar is 
 
 3.  Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2013). 
 4.  Id. (quoting McMackin v. Johnson Cnty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094, 
1099 (Wyo. 2003)). 
 5.  Id. at 333, 337. 
 6.  See id. 
 7.  Id. at 338. Because the harm in a loss of chance case is the loss of chance 
of survival, it is also interesting to note that under Dickhoff, a patient would likely 
succeed on a loss of chance claim even if she had a forty percent chance of 
recovery from her disease, which fell to ten percent due to her doctor’s 
malpractice. 
 8.  Sarah E. Bushnell, Loss of Chance: New Medical Malpractice Risk in 
Minnesota, BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2013, at 18, 21, available at http://mnbenchbar 
.com/2013/11/loss-of-chance (“The court’s description is fairly broad: ‘a 
physician harms a patient by negligently depriving her of a chance of recovery or 
survival and should be liable for the value of that chance.’”). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
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also concerned that Minnesota’s adoption of loss of chance will 
lead to more claims against medical providers, which would 
increase the amount of malpractice insurance premiums and the 
cost of medical treatment to patients.11 Although Dickhoff v. Green 
could usher in expansive changes to medical malpractice lawsuits, 
this note seeks to address only the lingering questions surrounding 
the loss of chance doctrine as it may be applied to Minnesota’s 
wrongful death statute. 
In analyzing and attempting to resolve the conflict between 
the loss of chance doctrine and Minnesota’s wrongful death statute, 
this note will examine the history of the wrongful death statute,12 
how the statute is applied today,13 and the supporting policy 
rationales.14 It will then analyze the Dickhoff decision15 and discuss 
the implications of the loss of chance doctrine within the current 
legal framework. This note concludes by presenting various options 
that other states have adopted to align the loss of chance doctrine 
with the wrongful death statute,16 and recommends that the 
Minnesota legislature amend the wrongful death statute to 
explicitly provide for the loss of chance doctrine.17 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 
A. The General Development of Wrongful Death Actions 
Wrongful death actions in the common law have a 
complicated history.18 The first wrinkle began with the seminal 
English case Baker v. Bolton, which proclaimed, “In a Civil Court, 
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an 
injury.”19 The courts in the United States had a mixed reaction to 
this opinion—some states directly admonished the opinion, while 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
 13.  See infra Part III. 
 14.  See infra Part III.B. 
 15.  See infra Part IV. 
 16.  See infra Part V. 
 17.  See infra Part VI. 
 18.  See generally Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. 
REV. 1043 (1965) (discussing the history of wrongful death actions in England and 
the United States). 
 19.  Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.) 1033; 1 Camp. 493, 
493–94. 
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others adopted its reasoning.20 The states that retained wrongful 
death actions at common law focused the recovery on the loss of 
services and allowed third parties with an interest in the life of the 
decedent to bring an action exclusively for the loss of the 
decedent’s services.21 
By the mid-nineteenth century, the question of whether there 
was a common law action for wrongful death became a contested 
issue in most jurisdictions, including those jurisdictions previously 
allowing wrongful death actions.22 This uncertainty, propelled by an 
increase in the frequency of accidents in the growing industrial 
economy, prompted state legislatures to take action and enact 
wrongful death statutes.23 The state of Massachusetts was the first to 
enact a wrongful death statute in 1840.24 This statute created a 
quasi-criminal remedy, which allowed the “widows and heirs” of a 
passenger killed by the negligence of a common carrier to collect a 
sum of money charged to the common carrier.25 Six years later, the 
 
 20.  See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful 
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century 
Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 731–32 (2000). But see Malone, supra note 18, 
at 1066–67 (arguing Baker v. Bolton was largely ignored in the United States until 
1848). 
 21.  See, e.g., Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 891, 892 (C.C.D. Me. 1827) 
(No. 11,233) (holding father could sue for the loss of services of his son); Shields 
v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 349–50 (1854) (holding father could recover for death of his 
minor son brought after son died in a railroad accident); Ford v. Monroe, 20 
Wend. 210, 210 (N.Y. 1838) (holding father could sue for loss of services of his 
ten-year-old son after son died in a carriage accident); Lynch v. Davis, 12 How. 
Pr. 323, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (holding a husband could bring an action against 
a doctor for the death of his wife). 
 22.  Witt, supra note 20, at 733; see, e.g., Plummer, 19 F. Cas. at 895–96 (holding 
a father can sue for the wages earned by his minor son who was killed by abusive 
superiors and overwork during a maritime voyage); Shields, 15 Ga. at 353–357 
(discussing when a wrongful death action should be allowed to proceed); Carey v. 
Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 477–80 (1848), overruled in part by Gaudette 
v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972) (holding there is no common law 
wrongful death action and it is for the legislature to authorize such a claim). 
 23.  Witt, supra note 20, at 733; see also Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38 
Vt. 294, 301 (1865) (“In view of the numerous deaths resulting from wrongful 
acts . . . and of the consequent deprivation suffered by the wife and 
children . . . for which injury neither the common law, nor existing statutes had 
provided a remedy, our legislature in 1849 passed [a wrongful death statute].”). 
 24.  Act of Mar. 23, 1840, ch. 80, 1840 Mass. Acts 224. 
 25.  Id. The Act stated: 
5
Biermann: The Practical Effects of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful Death Acti
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1548 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
English Parliament enacted a wrongful death statute referred to as 
Lord Campbell’s Act.26 This Act established what would become the 
basis of many wrongful death statutes in the United States, 
including Minnesota.27 
Lord Campbell’s Act codified the idea that a remedy in tort 
“dies with the person, unless statutory law makes an exception.”28 
The purpose of limiting a claimant’s ability to recover in a wrongful 
death action is twofold.29 First, it is based on the idea that the law 
provides a remedy only for harms that affect one’s legal rights.30 
Because a person does not have a legal right to the life of his or her 
family members, it is thought there is no legal obligation to 
pursue.31 Second, as a practical matter, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine the value of a human life.32 These 
rationales similarly justified the common law view that wrongful 
death actions were not actionable.33 
 
If the life of any person, being a passenger, shall be lost by reason of 
the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor or proprietors of any 
rail-road, steam-boat, stage coach, or of common carriers of 
passengers, or by the unfitness or gross negligence or carelessness of 
their servants or agents, in this Commonwealth, such proprietor or 
proprietors, and common carriers, shall be liable to a fine not 
exceeding five thousand dollars . . . for the benefit of his widow and 
heirs . . . . 
Id. 
 26.  Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1–2 (Eng.) [hereinafter 
Lord Campbell’s Act], reprinted in 17 HALSBURY’S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 4 (2d ed. 
1950). 
 27.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2012) (“A cause of action arising out of an 
injury to the person dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, 
except as provided in section 573.02.”), and id. § 573.02 (stating that when death is 
caused by a wrongful act, an appointed trustee may maintain an action for an 
injury caused by the wrongful act, so long as the decedent might have maintained 
an action had the decedent lived), with Lord Campbell’s Act, supra note 26 
(stating a wrongful death action can be brought when the death of a person is 
caused by a wrongful act that would have entitled the injured party to maintain an 
action if the person had survived). 
 28.  1 THOMAS BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 180 (3d ed. 1908). 
 29.  At common law, these rationales were also used to justify not recognizing 
wrongful death actions. See id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  See Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 480 (1848) (holding 
that in the absence of a statutory provision, an action cannot be maintained for 
6
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However, Lord Campbell’s Act provided the “exception” for 
when a person could sue for the wrongful death of his or her family 
members.34 It provided that when the death of a person was 
“caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or 
default is such as would (if the death had not ensued) have entitled 
the party injured to maintain an action,” then a wrongful death 
action could be brought.35 Recovery under these actions was limited 
to “the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death 
shall have been so caused,” and the action had to be brought to 
court “by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the 
person deceased.”36 The purpose of this Act was to address the 
inequity that existed at common law––where an action could not be 
maintained for wrongful death but was permitted for a personal 
injury claim if the actor survived.37 Therefore, prior to Lord 
Campbell’s Act, it was a legal windfall to the tortfeasor if the 
injured victim died from the injuries he or she sustained.38 
Importantly, at least initially following Lord Campbell’s Act, 
courts allowed plaintiffs to collect not only for pecuniary losses 
incurred by the decedent’s death, but also for the pain and 
suffering of the decedent.39 However, the next of kin could not 
recover for their own feelings of sorrow or remorse.40 
B. The Development of Wrongful Death Actions in Minnesota 
Minnesota’s first wrongful death statute was enacted in 1851 
while Minnesota was still a territory.41 Minnesota’s statute began by 
stating the expression implicit in Lord Campbell’s Act: “A cause of 
action arising out of an injury to the person, dies with the person of 
 
the wrongful death of another), overruled in part by Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 
222 (Mass. 1972). 
 34.  See Lord Campbell’s Act, supra note 26. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 350, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1961). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  BEVEN, supra note 28, at 183. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Minn. Rev. Stat. (Terr.) ch. 78, §§ 1–3 (1851); see also Cashman v. 
Hedberg, 215 Minn. 463, 466, 10 N.W.2d 388, 390 (1943) (holding the wrongful 
death statute is in derogation of the common law and establishing a new cause of 
action). 
7
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either party, except as provided [in the applicable statutory 
provision].”42 In pertinent part, the statute provided: 
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or 
omission of another, the personal representatives of the 
former, may maintain an action against the latter, if the 
former might have maintained an action, had he lived, 
against the latter, for an injury caused by the same act or 
omission . . . .43 
By stating the plaintiff may maintain an action if the decedent 
“might have maintained an action, had he lived,” the statute seems 
to imply that the plaintiff may recover the same damages the 
decedent would have been able to collect.44 However, this is not 
how the courts interpreted the statute. Instead, the courts 
interpreted the statute as allowing recovery for only the pecuniary 
losses suffered by the next of kin.45 
In 1905, the wrongful death statute was revised to incorporate 
these limitations on the next of kin’s recovery46: 
The damages awarded must be solely by way of 
compensation for pecuniary loss. Punitive damages are 
not allowed. No compensation can be awarded for 
wounded feelings, for the loss of the companionship and 
comfort of the deceased or for his pain and suffering. The 
true test is, what, in view of all the facts in evidence, was 
the probable pecuniary interest of the beneficiaries in the 
continuance of the life of the deceased? The proper 
estimate may be arrived at by taking into account the 
calling of the deceased and the income derived 
 
 42.  Minn. Rev. Stat. (Terr.) ch. 78, § 1. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id.; see BEVEN, supra note 28, at 183. 
 45.  Gunderson v. Nw. Elevator Co., 47 Minn. 161, 164, 49 N.W. 694, 695 
(1891) (holding damages in a wrongful death action “relate wholly to the 
pecuniary injury suffered by the next of kin” and cannot include recovery for 
“injured feelings[] or a solatium”); Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126, 128, 14 
N.W.  575, 575 (1883) (focusing on decedent’s ability to provide future pecuniary 
benefit to next of kin had he lived). 
 46.  REVISED LAWS MINNESOTA 1905, § 4503, at 961 (Mark B. Dunnell ed., 
1906) (“When death is caused by a wrongful act or omission of any person or 
corporation, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain an action 
therefor if he might have maintained an action, had he lived, for an injury caused 
by the same act or omission.”). 
8
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therefrom, his health, age, probable duration of life, 
talents, habits of industry, success in life in the past and 
the amount of aid in money or services which he was 
accustomed to furnish the beneficiaries.47 
The statute also provided an additional avenue for damages if the 
deceased was the “head of the family”: 
If the deceased was the head of a family the value of his 
services to the family cannot be limited in a pecuniary 
sense to the amount of his daily wages earned for their 
support. His constant daily services, attention, and care in 
their behalf, in the relation which he sustained to them, 
may be considered as well . . . .48 
While the damages allowed under the 1905 statute seem 
somewhat expansive, the legislature limited a wrongful death claim 
under the statute to $5000.49 The next substantial revision to 
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute occurred in 195150 when the 
legislature again amended the type of damages a claimant could 
recover.51 The statute as amended stated: “The recovery in [a 
wrongful death] action in such an amount as the jury may deem 
fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss, resulting from such 
death, shall not exceed $17,500, and shall be for the exclusive 
benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin . . . .”52 This revision 
again limited the scope of a wrongful death claim by removing the 
language regarding the “head of household” damages and 
reinstated that a claimant could only recover pecuniary damages.53 
In 1983, the legislature removed the cap on recovery and 
opened the door for claimants to recover punitive damages in 
appropriate cases.54 This amendment was important because it 
significantly increased a plaintiff’s potential recovery under the 
 
 47.  Id. § 4503, subdiv. 16, at 962. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. § 4503, at 961. 
 50.  Minnesota’s wrongful death statute was amended in 1911 and 1935, 
which increased the cap on wrongful death damages to $7500 and $10,000, 
respectively. Act of Apr. 19, 1911, ch. 281, § 4503, 1911 Minn. Laws 395; Act of 
July 1, 1935, ch. 325, § 1, 9657, 1935 Minn. Laws 596. 
 51.  Act of Apr. 23, 1951, ch. 697, § 1, 1951 Minn. Laws 1215. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 347, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws 2397, 2398 (“Punitive 
damages may be awarded as provided in section 549.20.”). 
9
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statute, as it went from allowing plaintiffs to recover only for 
pecuniary losses in the amount of $35,000 or less, to removing the 
cap on damages and allowing for the recovery of punitive 
damages.55 In addition, the legislature’s amendment divided the 
provisions and expanded the scope of the statute56 to reflect the 
structure of the present wrongful death statute.57 
III. MINNESOTA’S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE 
A. What Is Necessary to Bring a Wrongful Death Claim Today? 
Today, a wrongful death claim is still a creature of statute and 
a reflection of Lord Campbell’s Act. Minnesota Statutes section 
573.01 states: 
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person 
dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, 
except as provided in section 573.02. All other causes of 
action by one against another, whether arising on 
contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of 
the former and against those of the latter.58 
In other words, unless the exception listed in Minnesota Statutes 
section 573.02 applies, the cause of action dies with the plaintiff.59 
In pertinent part, Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 provides: 
When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of 
any person or corporation, the trustee . . . may maintain 
an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained 
an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by 
the wrongful act or omission.60 
 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  Under this revision, the statute made reference to the damages that are 
recoverable after murder or professional negligence. See id. 
 57.  See id. (paralleling the current wrongful death statute through use of 
nearly identical language and structure). 
 58.  MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2012). 
 59.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 1999) (“A 
wrongful death claim is purely statutory, as common law recognized no such 
actions on the theory that a claim for personal injuries died with the victim.”); 
Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 350, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1961) (“At common 
law a civil action for wrongful death was not permitted . . . . It was, therefore, to 
the wrongdoer’s financial interest if his injured victim died.”). 
 60.  MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1. 
10
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This section further provides that damages are limited in a 
wrongful death claim. With reference to damages the statute 
specifically states: 
The recovery in the action is the amount the jury deems 
fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss resulting 
from the death, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of 
the surviving spouse and next of kin, proportionate to the 
pecuniary loss severally suffered by the death.61 
Taken together, the present wrongful death statute in 
Minnesota requires a party to establish four elements to recover: 
(1) a proper appointment of a trustee pursuant to Minnesota 
Statutes section 573.02, subdivision 3;62 (2) the fact of death; 
(3) caused by the wrongful act of the defendant; and (4) causing 
pecuniary loss63 to a surviving spouse or next of kin.64 
B. What Types of Damages Are Recoverable Under Minnesota’s Wrongful 
Death Statute? 
While the wrongful death statute is written only in terms of 
pecuniary damages, Minnesota courts have expanded the 
definition of “pecuniary loss” to apply not only actual loss of 
income, contributions, and services, but also to include the loss of 
advice, comfort, and protection the decedent may have provided to 
his or her family.65 As statutory revisions and case law have 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  The appointed trustee for a wrongful death action is usually the family 
member who filed the wrongful death statute. However, the statute dictates: 
Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or one of the next of kin, 
the court having jurisdiction of an action falling within the provisions 
of subdivisions 1 or 2, shall appoint a suitable and competent person as 
trustee to commence or continue such action and obtain recovery of 
damages therein. The trustee, before commencing duties shall file a 
consent and oath. Before receiving any money, the trustee shall file a 
bond as security therefor in such form and with such sureties as the 
court may require. 
Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 3. 
 63.  Pecuniary loss is defined as “[a] loss of money or of something having 
monetary value.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (9th ed. 2009). But see Fussner, 
261 Minn. at 359, 113 N.W.2d at 363 (holding “pecuniary loss” as described in 
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute is not limited to a loss of income). 
 64.  28A DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: ELEMENTS OF AN ACTION § 22:1 
(2014). 
 65.  Fussner, 261 Minn. at 360, 113 N.W.2d at 363; see also Rath v. Hamilton 
11
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highlighted, the law seems to reflect a growing appreciation of the 
intangible value in family relationships, which is why the law allows 
family members to recover damages not just for the loss of services 
that the decedent family member could have provided, but also for 
the aid, comfort, and assistance that could have been derived from 
a continued relationship with the decedent.66 
However, it is important to note that there can be no recovery 
by the surviving family members under a wrongful death action for 
the pain and suffering of the decedent or for grief or sorrow of the 
family members.67 This black letter rule of law is a reflection of the 
purpose of the present-day wrongful death statute––that of 
compensating surviving spouses and next-of-kin for the monetary 
value of lost support, services, and property.68 The emphasis of a 
wrongful death action is on the losses the decedent’s family 
suffered as a result of the decedent’s death; family members are 
unable to recover for losses that were distinctly the decedent’s.69 
Accordingly, all necessary funeral, hospital, and medical 
expenses are recoverable by the decedent’s heirs because this is 
 
Standard Div. of United Techs. Corp., 292 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1980) 
(explaining pecuniary loss not limited to income loss); Cummins v. Rachner, 
257 N.W.2d 808, 815 (Minn. 1977) (stating jury should consider loss of counsel, 
guidance, advice, comfort, assistance, and protection decedent would have given 
children had decedent lived); McCorkell v. City of Northfield, 272 Minn. 24, 30, 
136 N.W.2d 840, 844 (1965) (holding damages for potential support of children 
may be awarded even if children were adults). 
 66.  See Cummins, 257 N.W.2d at 815 (stating pecuniary loss to the decedent’s 
family is measured against achievements of the deceased and her daily 
contributions to the family). 
 67.  See Hutchins v. St. Paul, M&M Ry., 44 Minn. 5, 9, 46 N.W. 79, 80–81 
(1890) (holding wrongful death actions are distinguishable from personal injury 
actions, which allow a plaintiff to collect for pain and suffering because the next of 
kin cannot receive compensation for the decedent’s pain and suffering or their 
feelings of sorrow); see, e.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding father of decedent could not recover for emotional distress 
or suffering in wrongful death action). 
 68.  27 MICHAEL K. STEENSON ET AL., MINNESOTA PRACTICE: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LAW § 13.13 (2013 ed.) (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 573.01, subdiv. 1 (2012)). 
 69.  Id. The most illustrative example of this type of loss is pain and suffering. 
In a personal injury action the person who underwent this pain and suffering is 
bringing the action and therefore can recover for this loss. However, if this 
plaintiff were to die while bringing this claim, the claim is transitioned into a 
statutory wrongful death claim, and recovery for pain and suffering is no longer a 
proper measure of damages. 
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money that would otherwise have to come out of the decedent’s 
estate.70 As noted above,71 a fairly recent change to the wrongful 
death statute allows for heirs to recover punitive damages in a 
wrongful death action.72 The Minnesota legislature made this 
amendment in 1983, and it significantly expanded an area of 
damages where courts had not previously allowed recovery.73 
In sum, surviving family members may recover for loss of 
income, contributions, services, advice, comfort, and protection 
under Minnesota’s wrongful death statute.74 They may also recover 
for the decedent’s medical expenses and funeral costs, but they are 
unable to recover for the pain and suffering the decedent 
experienced from the defendant’s negligence.75 According to 
Minnesota’s present wrongful death statute, this type of claim dies 
with the decedent.76 
IV. THE DICKHOFF V. GREEN DECISION 
A. Introduction to the Significance of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful 
Death Actions in Minnesota 
At the end of May 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued 
an opinion that will have lasting implications for medical 
malpractice law in Minnesota. In Dickhoff,77 the court recognized 
the loss of chance doctrine for the first time in Minnesota history. 
While twenty-one states across the country and the District of 
Columbia already recognize loss of chance and have been applying 
the law for a number of years in their own states,78 the doctrine 
 
 70.  Prescott v. Swanson, 197 Minn. 325, 339, 267 N.W. 251, 258–59 (1936). 
 71.  See supra Part II.A. 
 72.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1 (“Punitive damages may be awarded as 
provided in [Minnesota Statutes] section 549.20.”). Minnesota Statutes section 
549.20 provides that punitive damages are recoverable “upon clear and convincing 
evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or 
safety of others.” Id. § 549.20, subdiv. 1. 
 73.  See, e.g., Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 
228 (Minn. 1982) (denying punitive damages in wrongful death action). 
 74.  27 STEENSON ET AL., supra note 68, § 13.13. 
 75.  Tiedeken v. Tiedeken, 363 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(citing Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228 (“A wrongful death claim, unlike a claim for 
personal injuries, does not include compensation for pain and suffering.”)). 
 76.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 573.01, 573.02, subdiv. 1. 
 77.  836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013). 
 78.  Id. at 334 n.12 (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 n.23 
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presents a novel question in Minnesota because of our unique 
wrongful death statute. As this note explained in Part III, 
Minnesota law forecloses recovery to claimants for any damages 
that were suffered solely by the decedent, for example, for pain and 
suffering damages. And as delineated by Minnesota Statutes 
section 573.01, this type of personal injury claim dies with the 
decedent.79 
Therefore, in the wake of the Dickhoff decision, vital questions 
remain open and unanswered: Will loss of chance claims be 
available to plaintiffs through the wrongful death statute? Will 
damages for loss of chance be measured in terms of personal injury 
(including pain and suffering damages), or will damages be 
measured in terms of traditional wrongful death damages 
(pecuniary loss to the next of kin)? And, what implications might 
this have for Minnesota’s wrongful death statute? In the sections 
that follow, this note will provide insight into the Dickhoff decision 
and will then explore the case law developed in other states to 
understand how these questions may be addressed. 
B. Facts and Procedure 
Jocelyn Dickhoff was a newborn when her parents, Joseph and 
Kayla Dickhoff, observed a lump on her backside.80 Her parents 
(Plaintiffs) testified they immediately brought the lump to their 
pediatrician’s attention at Jocelyn’s two-week appointment.81 At this 
time the lump was pea-sized and Dr. Tollefsrud told the Dickhoffs 
she would “keep an eye on it.”82 Despite this assurance, it was not 
until after their daughter’s one-year examination that the lump’s 
growth was properly assessed by Jocelyn’s pediatrician and 
diagnosed as a cancerous tumor.83 The time that had elapsed 
between her two-week check-up and her one-year examination was 
significant because the disease had advanced and metastasized.84 
 
(Mass. 2008)). 
 79.  MINN. STAT. § 573.01; see also Tiedeken, 363 N.W.2d at 910–11. 
 80.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 324. 
 81.  Id. at 325. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
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Following her diagnosis, Jocelyn began an intense course of 
treatment, consisting of chemotherapy, surgery, and radiation.85 
On April 6, 2009, Plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice 
action against Jocelyn’s physician and the hospital (Defendants).86 
Plaintiffs’ experts indicated that the delay in Jocelyn’s diagnosis 
took her from a sixty percent chance of surviving her disease to a 
forty percent chance of survival.87 Stated differently, Jocelyn went 
from likely surviving her cancer to probably dying from it due to 
her doctor’s negligence in failing to diagnose her cancer or refer 
her to a specialist.88 Therefore, Plaintiffs sought 
compensation for (1) the cost of medical treatment 
related to the 2010 recurrence of Jocelyn’s cancer, as well 
as pain and suffering that Jocelyn experienced as a result 
of that treatment; and (2) Jocelyn’s decreased chance of 
surviving the cancer in the future and the probability that 
she will die from the disease.89 
The district court ruled Plaintiffs could not recover for 
Jocelyn’s past medical expenses because she would have received 
essentially the same treatments90 even in the absence of 
Defendants’ negligence.91 Defendants moved for summary 
judgment and the district court granted the motion, concluding 
Plaintiffs’ claim to recover for “reduced life expectancy and 
increased risk of reoccurrence” was essentially a loss of chance 
claim and was not recognized in Minnesota.92 
Plaintiffs appealed and the court of appeals reversed the 
district court.93 Here it became important that Plaintiffs framed 
their claim as one for improbable survival instead of as one for a 
loss of chance.94 Plaintiffs likely chose to frame their case as one as 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 326. 
 87.  Id. at 326. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 338 (Dietzen, J., dissenting). 
 90.  Plaintiffs conceded that Jocelyn would have received chemotherapy, 
surgery, and radiation even without Defendants’ negligence. Id. at 327 (majority 
opinion). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 328. 
 94.  See id. 
15
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improbable survival instead of loss of chance because of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Fabio v. Bellomo.95 
In Fabio, the Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with a 
similar fact pattern: the plaintiff had two physical examinations by 
her physician in which her physician discovered a lump in the 
plaintiff’s breast.96 He told the plaintiff that the lump was a fibrous 
mass and “not to worry about it.”97 Upon an examination by 
another doctor, a biopsy was ordered and it was discovered plaintiff 
had two tumors and her cancer had metastasized.98 The plaintiff 
argued that the defendant’s negligence created a reduced chance 
of survival and an increased chance of reoccurrence of cancer 
because he misdiagnosed and failed to promptly treat the mass in 
the plaintiff’s breast.99 In Fabio, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized this as a loss of chance argument and declined to adopt 
it as a new cause of action.100 
Nevertheless, the court of appeals was persuaded by Plaintiffs’ 
distinction between loss of chance and improbable recovery, and 
ruled Plaintiffs’ arguments amounted to a claim for medical 
malpractice and did not constitute an inactionable loss of chance 
claim.101 However, despite Plaintiffs’ carefully phrased arguments, 
the supreme court labeled the action as one of loss of chance and 
analyzed the case within that context. 
 
 95.  504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993). 
 96.  Id. at 760. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 762. 
 100.  Id. (“We have never recognized loss of chance in the context of a medical 
malpractice action, and we decline to recognize it in this case.”). 
 101. Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 811 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2012), aff’d, 836 N.W.2d 321(Minn. 2013). 
We believe that the supreme court did not intend to completely 
foreclose the possibility of malpractice actions for negligent cancer-
misdiagnosis cases involving a lengthy illness with a potentially fatal 
outcome. Instead, we read the caselaw only to limit those actions to 
circumstances in which it has become more probable than not that the 
patient will not survive the cancer. 
Id. (citing MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 711, 722 (Minn. 2008)). 
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C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished 
Dickhoff from Fabio and recognized loss of chance as an actionable 
doctrine under Minnesota law.102 The loss of chance doctrine allows 
recovery when a physician’s negligence causes a reduction in the 
patient’s chance to survive or recover from his or her illness.103 The 
court also decided a patient can successfully sue his or her 
physician for an increased risk of not recovering from the 
underlying illness and for a decreased life expectancy as stand-
alone damages.104 There seems to be only one limitation to this new 
theory of recovery: the patient’s increased risk of dying and 
decreased life expectancy must be “substantial.”105 In establishing 
loss of chance, the court reasoned the loss of chance of survival and 
recovery is a real injury to a person, and prohibiting the cause of 
action “‘fails to deter’ medical negligence because it immunizes 
‘whole areas of medical malpractice from liability,’” namely 
immunizing doctors from liability when a patient’s chance of 
recovery is below fifty percent.106 Accordingly, the court concluded, 
“a physician harms a patient by negligently depriving her of a 
chance of recovery or survival and should be liable for the value of 
that lost chance.”107 
 
 102.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 331–33. Interestingly, because Justice Barry 
Anderson and Justice Wright did not take part in the decision, the opinion 
establishing loss of chance in Minnesota was decided by only a 3-2 decision. See id. 
at 338. 
 103.  Id. at 333. 
 104.  Id. at 334 (“[W]e conclude that a physician harms a patient by 
negligently depriving her of a chance of recovery or survival and should be liable 
for the value of that lost chance.”). 
 105.  Id. at 337 (noting that the court of appeals’ theory of causation is 
unreasonable because a plaintiff whose odds of survival dropped slightly from fifty-
one to forty-nine percent would have a recognized medical malpractice claim, but 
a plaintiff whose odds of survival dropped from forty-nine to zero percent, as a 
result of a physician’s negligence, would not be able to establish that the physician 
caused any harm); see Bushnell, supra note 8, at 19 (“To be actionable, the 
diminution of chance must be more than ‘token’ or ‘de minimis.’”); Alex Stein, A 
Patient’s Decreased Chance to Survive or Recover Held Actionable as a Standalone Damage, 
STEIN ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, http://steinmedicalmalpractice.com/dickhoff-v 
-green-nw2d-2013-wl-2363550-minn-2013 (last visited April 21, 2014). 
 106.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 
819, 830 (Mass. 2008)). 
 107.  Id. at 334. 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court also provided guidance on how 
to measure damages for a loss of chance claim.108 The court 
explained that this determination includes a two-step process 
where the lost chance is first measured and then valued.109 The 
damages for a loss of chance analysis are “measured as ‘the 
percentage probability by which the defendant’s tortious conduct 
diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable 
outcome.’”110 With respect to valuing that loss of chance, the court 
noted that other jurisdictions that had recognized loss of chance as 
a “distinct and compensable injury,” had “tended to adopt the 
proportional-recovery approach.”111 
Under the proportional-recovery approach, a patient’s 
damages for injury or death “are discounted by the value of the 
chance that the physician’s negligence destroyed.”112 In other 
words, the total amount of damages recoverable “is equal to the 
percentage chance of survival or cure lost, multiplied by the total 
amount of damages allowable for the death or injury.”113 
 
 108.  See id. at 335–36. For an easy example of the ideas behind the loss of 
chance doctrine outside the medical malpractice realm, see Chaplin v. Hicks, 
[1911] 2 K.B. 786 (Eng.). In this case, the plaintiff entered into a contract to 
compete for selection as one of twelve finalists in a pageant. If selected, the 
plaintiff would have gained employment for three years on stage within the 
theater. However, because the contest manager failed to notify the plaintiff that 
she qualified for an interview, the plaintiff missed the interview and was not 
selected as a finalist. The court explained that while each contestant had no better 
than a twenty-five percent chance of winning, that chance was a viable legal 
interest. 
 109.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 335. 
 110.  Id. (quoting Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 839). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 336. The following is an example provided by the court in Dickhoff: 
For example, assume that a physician negligently fails to diagnose 
a patient’s cancer. The patient dies. If the patient had only a 
40 percent chance of survival before the medical malpractice, but 
the physician’s negligence reduced her chance of survival to 
0 percent, then the physician should be liable for 40 percent of 
the damages, or the portion of the value that the defendant’s 
negligence destroyed. . . . If the fact-finder determines that total 
damages for the patient’s death are $100,000, then the patient’s 
loss of chance damages would be $40,000. 
Id. at 336 n.15 (internal citation omitted). 
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In applying this formula to the present case, the court stated 
that the appropriate baseline to determine the damages for 
Jocelyn’s injury was to subtract the value of the reduction of 
Jocelyn’s life expectancy from her pre-negligence life expectancy.114 
However, the court indicated this formula would have been altered 
if Jocelyn had died from her illness.115 Ultimately, the court left it to 
the fact-finder to determine the amount of damages necessary to 
provide compensation for Jocelyn’s reduced life expectancy.116 
After setting out the general standard to be used in damage 
calculations, the court analyzed whether Plaintiffs provided a 
sufficient causal link between Jocelyn’s injury and defendants’ 
negligence.117 The court first considered the reasoning used by the 
court of appeals.118 The court of appeals, relying on dicta from the 
supreme court’s decision in MacRae v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,119 
held that Plaintiffs “must prove only that Jocelyn’s chances of death 
from her cancer moved from unlikely to likely.”120 However, the 
supreme court rejected this approach and asserted that, “a plaintiff 
must prove, among other things, that it is more probable than not 
that his or her injury was a result of the defendant health care 
provider’s negligence.”121 It reasoned the court of appeals’ 
rationale must be abandoned because of its potentially “troubling 
consequences”122 and instead held “a plaintiff must prove that the 
 
 114.  Id. at 336 (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 282–83 (Ind. 
2000)). 
 115.  Id. (“[U]nder our view of the loss of chance doctrine, the total amount of 
damages recoverable is equal to the percentage chance of survival or cure lost, 
multiplied by the total amount of damages allowable for the death or injury [of the 
patient].” (emphasis added)). Though Jocelyn Dickhoff was alive for the entirety 
of this case, sadly, she passed away on July 6, 2013, from her illness at the age of 
seven. Randy Olson, Death Brings Change in Dickhoff Case, SAUK CENTRE HERALD 
(July 12, 2013), http://www.saukherald.com/articles/2013/07/12/death-brings 
-change-dickhoff-case. 
 116.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 336. 
 117.  See id. at 337–38. 
 118.  Id. at 337. 
 119.  753 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2008). 
 120.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 337. 
 121.  Id. (quoting Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 1992)). 
 122.  Id. 
The troubling consequence of the court of appeals’ holding is that a 
plaintiff whose odds of survival drop from 51 percent to 49 percent has 
a cognizable medical malpractice claim, while a patient whose odds of 
survival are reduced from 49 percent to 0 percent as a result of a 
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defendant health care provider’s negligence more likely than not 
caused the claimed injury.”123 
In this case, the supreme court concluded that Plaintiffs’ 
expert affidavits, which opined defendants’ failure to timely 
diagnose Jocelyn’s cancer caused a substantial increase in the 
likelihood that Jocelyn’s cancer would reoccur and decreased her 
chances of survival by at least twenty percent, were sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact on the element of 
causation.124 Consistent with its holdings establishing loss of chance 
and causation, the court concluded a reasonable jury could find 
that Jocelyn’s injury––the loss of chance of survival––was a result of 
defendants’ negligence.125 It ruled the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment for Defendants and remanded the 
case for trial.126 
V. THE OPTIONS: WHERE SHOULD MINNESOTA GO FROM HERE? 
In the last three decades, twenty-two states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted some form of the loss of chance 
doctrine,127 nine states have declined to adopt the doctrine,128 and 
nineteen states have not yet ruled on the issue.129 Among the states 
that have adopted loss of chance into their jurisprudence, many 
have already overcome the practical issues that Minnesota is now 
facing, and these states provide valuable insight on Minnesota’s 
 
physician’s negligence is unable to ever establish, as a matter of law, 
that the physician caused any harm. 
Id. 
 123.  Id. (citing Leubner, 493 N.W.2d at 121; Smith v. Knowles, 281 N.W.2d 653, 
656 (Minn. 1979)). 
 124.  Id. at 338. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 334 n.12 (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 n.23 
(2008)).These states include Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Also included in the count is Minnesota. 
 128.  Id. These states include Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. Id. 
 129.  See id. The states that have not yet ruled on the doctrine are Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Utah. See id. 
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present quandary: how does a plaintiff bringing a loss of chance 
claim surmount the legal barriers imposed by the wrongful death 
statute? The following sections will address how the adoption of 
loss of chance will affect medical malpractice claims. It will then 
present various routes that other states have taken to address the 
potentially prohibitive wrongful death statute. 
A. How Does the Loss of Chance Doctrine Affect a Claim for Medical 
Malpractice? 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Dickhoff, explained that to 
establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice, 
a plaintiff must prove, on the basis of expert medical 
testimony, “(1) the standard of care recognized by the 
medical community as applicable to the particular 
defendant’s conduct, (2) that the defendant in fact 
departed from that standard, and (3) that the defendant’s 
departure from the standard was a direct cause of [the 
patient’s] injuries.”130 
This standard is similar to the standard used in other states, the 
main difference being that many states do not use the standard 
common to the community to establish duty, and instead use a 
straightforward negligence approach.131 However, using either 
method of recovery, a traditional medical malpractice claim 
prevents recovery for plaintiffs whose chances of survival were less 
than fifty-one percent before the defendant’s negligence.132 Over 
the past two decades, courts have utilized the loss of chance 
doctrine to correct this “all or nothing” approach and allow a 
plaintiff to recover even if the plaintiff’s chances for survival were 
less than fifty-one percent before the defendant’s negligence.133 It 
 
 130.  Id. at 329 (quoting Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 
(Minn. 1982)). 
 131.  In a medical malpractice suit, a plaintiff must prove the four elements of 
negligence to recover: (1) the physician owed a duty of care to the patient; (2) the 
physician breached this duty; (3) the breach actually caused the patient’s injury; 
and (4) the patient suffered damages from the breach. See, e.g., Gooding v. Univ. 
Hosp. Bldg. Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984); see also Robert A. Reisig, Jr., 
The Loss of A Chance Theory in Medical Malpractice Cases: An Overview, 13 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 1163, 1164 (1990). 
 132.  See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 333 (arguing the “all or nothing” approach to 
causation undermines the fundamental aims of tort law and instead immunizes 
entire areas of medical malpractice from liability). 
 133.  Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury 
21
Biermann: The Practical Effects of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful Death Acti
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1564 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
was argued, and the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to accept,134 
that the proportional damages approach to loss of chance allows 
damages to be awarded in direct proportion to the harm caused, 
while preserving the traditional principles of causation.135 
B. The Damages Available Under Loss of Chance and Wrongful Death 
Statutes 
While on its face the loss of chance doctrine seems like a fairly 
straightforward answer to a lingering policy question in the medical 
malpractice arena, courts in many jurisdictions have struggled with 
its practical applications. One of the central questions presented in 
Minnesota is how the doctrine will affect wrongful death claims and 
the future of the wrongful death statute. It can be argued that 
wrongful death statutes, which are designed to compensate 
survivors for the loss of a loved one,136 are at odds with loss of 
chance and could actually prevent recovery. This is because most 
wrongful death statutes require a showing that the defendant’s 
negligent act or omission “caused” the plaintiff’s death.137 A 
wrongful death statute allows for recovery when the defendant 
caused the death of the decedent and compensates survivors for their 
loss,138 while loss of chance allows for recovery when the defendant 
 
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 
1377–78 (1981) (describing how the all or nothing approach to causation weakens 
the compensatory, risk spreading, and deterrence objectives of tort law); 
cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (listing the purposes for 
awarding tort damages, including deterrence). 
 134.  See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 335–37. 
 135.  See, e.g., Mead v. Adrian, 670 N.W.2d 174, 188 (Iowa 2003) (Cady, J., 
concurring); Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 840 (Mass. 2008); Roberts 
v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484 (Ohio 1996). See 
generally Stephen F. Brennwald, Proving Causation in “Loss of a Chance” Cases: A 
Proportional Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 754 (1985). The traditional 
standards of causation are maintained because the injury complained of is the lost 
chance of survival. This means the causation question is: But-for the defendant’s 
negligent treatment or diagnosis, would the plaintiff have suffered the lost chance 
of survival? 
 136.  27 STEENSON ET AL., supra note 68, § 13.13. 
 137.  Brennwald, supra note 135, at 786–88; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 573.02 
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
 138.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (“When death is caused by the wrongful act or 
omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in 
subdivision 3 may maintain an action therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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caused the lost chance and does not compensate the survivors for their 
loss.139 Instead, the focus of a loss of chance claim is on the 
decedent––on the loss he or she suffered before death. 
C. What Have Other States Done? 
1. Decisive Legislative Action 
In two states where the high courts have endorsed loss of 
chance, Michigan140 and South Dakota,141 the legislature stepped in 
and extinguished a plaintiff’s right to recover under the doctrine.142 
In Michigan, after the court established the loss of chance cause of 
action, the legislature responded by altering a plaintiff’s recovery 
under a loss of chance theory.143 Similarly, after South Dakota’s 
high court adopted loss of chance, the legislature abrogated the 
decision. The statute directly states: 
The Legislature finds that in those actions founded upon 
an alleged want of ordinary care or skill the conduct of 
the responsible party must be shown to have been the 
proximate cause of the injury complained of. The 
Legislature also finds that the application of the so called 
loss of chance doctrine in such cases improperly alters or 
eliminates the requirement of proximate causation. 
 
 139.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 337–38. 
 140.  See Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 443, 461–62 (Mich. 1990) 
(recognizing loss of chance doctrine), superseded by statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.2912a, as recognized in O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 487 Mich. 485 
(Mich. 2010). 
 141.  See Jorgenson v. Vener, 640 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 2002) (establishing loss of 
chance doctrine). 
 142.  For Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (stating in a medical malpractice action plaintiff cannot 
recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better 
result unless the opportunity was greater than fifty percent); see also Weymers v. 
Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Mich. 1997) (holding that Michigan “does not 
recognize a cause of action for the loss of an opportunity to avoid physical harm 
less than death”). For South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-1.1, 1.2 (2013) 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (abrogating the holding in Jorgenson and 
declaring the application of loss of chance “improperly alters or eliminates the 
requirement of proximate causation”). 
 143.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a(2) (Westlaw) (limiting loss of chance 
claims to plaintiffs who had a greater than fifty percent opportunity of surviving 
his or her illness). 
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Therefore, the rule in Jorgenson v. Vener, 2000 SD 87, 
616 N.W. 2d 366 (2000) is hereby abrogated.144 
In other words, though the high courts in these states chose to 
adopt loss of chance, the legislature abrogated the rulings due to 
the weighty public policy concerns associated with the doctrine’s 
establishment.145 Conversely, in California and Maryland, the courts 
have declined to adopt loss of chance because the policy concerns 
at issue were deemed to be better suited for legislative debate and 
action.146 It does not appear, however, that any other states have 
taken similar legislative recourse after the imposition of loss of 
chance within their borders. 
2. Circumventing the Wrongful Death Statute 
The defense bar may assert Minnesota’s wrongful death statute 
does not apply to loss of chance actions based on the statutory 
interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 573.02. As explained 
in Part III of this note, the statute states “[w]hen death is caused by 
the wrongful act or omission of any person . . . the trustee . . . may 
maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained 
an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the 
wrongful act or omission.”147 Because the decedent’s death was not 
caused by the defendant-doctor’s negligence but rather was caused 
by the decedent’s underlying disease, the defense bar may argue 
the wrongful death statute is not applicable and the patient’s next 
of kin is foreclosed from bringing a loss of chance claim.148 
 
 144.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (Westlaw). 
 145.  See id. (stating concerns about implications on proximate causation). 
 146.  Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1608 (1991); Fennell v. S. Md. 
Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 520 A.2d 206, 214–15 (Md. 1990); see Shively v. Klein, 551 A.2d 41, 
44 (Del. 1998) (noting that given the drastic change in traditional proof the 
establishment of loss of chance is best left to the legislature). 
 147.  MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 148.  See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 835 (Mass. 2008) 
(defendant made the same argument). The Massachusetts wrongful death statute 
is similarly worded to the Minnesota wrongful death statute in that they both 
require the defendant to “cause the death of the person.” Compare MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 38 of the 2014 2nd Ann. Sess.), with 
MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2012). The defense in Matsuyama argued that the language 
of the statute—“causes the death”—precludes loss of chance claims and “allows 
only claims that the defendant was a but-for cause of the decedent’s death.” 
Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected this 
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However, adopting this restrictive interpretation would draw 
an arbitrary line between plaintiffs who survive their illnesses and 
plaintiffs who die during trial or prior to filing suit. Drawing this 
distinction between plaintiffs could render the loss of chance 
doctrine all but meaningless. For example, in Dickhoff, the patient, 
Jocelyn, was able to survive the legal proceedings and recover 
against her doctor for failing to properly diagnose her disease.149 
However, not even two months after the Minnesota Supreme Court 
issued its decision on her case, Jocelyn tragically passed away from 
her disease.150 Because the injury in this action is the loss of chance 
to live, it is an unfortunate guarantee that many plaintiffs with 
viable claims would be foreclosed from bringing an action simply 
because they died before the action could be brought, or before 
the action concluded, unless they are allowed to bring a claim via 
the wrongful death statute. If Jocelyn had passed away at the end of 
May, instead of the beginning of July, her parents would have had 
to convert her claim into a wrongful death action. Therefore, if the 
argument presented in this section is accepted, Jocelyn’s parents 
would have been foreclosed from asserting her loss of chance claim 
via the wrongful death statute, and Jocelyn’s action would have 
been dismissed without recovery upon her death. 
The practical implications of this type of ruling would be 
unjust and far reaching. Patients with viable loss of chance claims 
may not bring a claim if their health is uncertain, because if they 
were to die prior to the case being resolved, their case would be 
dismissed and would not be converted into a wrongful death claim 
for the benefit of their next of kin.151 Furthermore, practically 
speaking, attorneys would be hesitant to represent plaintiffs for loss 
of chance claims because, given the nature of the cause of action, 
most, if not all, of these plaintiffs would have uncertain health 
conditions, and an attorney would not want to pursue a claim that 
could be dismissed if the plaintiff dies during the trial. Overall, 
while a resolution by this type of statutory interpretation may be an 
attractive bright-line rule at first glance, Minnesota courts should 
reject it for the policy reasons expressed above.152 
 
argument and stated this interpretation was not required by the wrongful death 
statute. Id. 
 149.  Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 338 (Minn. 2013). 
 150.  Olson, supra note 115. 
 151.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1. 
 152.  In addition, it is arguable, based on common sense, that if the Minnesota 
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3. Amending or Interpreting the Wrongful Death Statute: The 
Massachusetts Approach 
To allow plaintiffs to bring a loss of chance claim under 
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute, the legislature could amend 
the existing wrongful death statute to explicitly allow the loss of 
chance of survival. Or, the court may choose to interpret the 
wrongful death statute as encompassing loss of chance claims.153 
Under this approach, the language allowing recovery when the 
defendant negligently caused the death of another would be 
interpreted as incorporating another meaning: the defendant will 
be deemed to have negligently caused the death of another 
whenever he or she causes a reduction in a person’s chance of 
survival.154 An example of this type of solution is the Massachusetts 
high court’s decision in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.155 
In Matsuyama, the court directly addressed the issue of 
whether Massachusetts’s wrongful death statute precluded loss of 
chance and decided the statute only sets forth procedural 
requirements on recovery, while the common law wrongful death 
doctrine provides the actual right to recovery and has evolved to 
encompass loss of chance.156 Specifically, the court held that as 
medical science has progressed and developed methods that are 
able to quantify 
 
Supreme Court established the loss of chance doctrine, the court did so because it 
wanted to provide plaintiffs with the cause of action. The court did not establish 
the cause of action, so it could be rendered meaningless through statutory 
interpretation. 
 153.  See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 838 (interpreting the Massachusetts 
wrongful death statute to allow for loss of chance claims though the claim is not 
authorized by the express wording of the statute). 
 154.  See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 487 
(Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (interpreting the wrongful death statute at 
issue to incorporate a loss of chance claim and allow for recovery). 
 155.  890 N.E.2d 819. 
 156.  Id. at 838; see, e.g., Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972) 
(allowing plaintiff to bring a claim under the wrongful death statute where the 
language of the statute did not provide plaintiff with a right to recover but the 
wrongful death statute was interpreted to provide only the procedural 
requirements). But see Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice: 
The Need for Caution, 87 MASS. L. REV. 3, 16–17 (2002) (contending the 
Massachusetts wrongful death statute is “fundamentally inconsistent” with loss of 
chance doctrine). 
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the extent to which malpractice damaged the patient’s 
prospects for survival, and in light of the strong public 
policy favoring compensation for victims of medical 
malpractice and the deterrence of deviations from 
appropriate standards of care, loss of chance of survival 
rightly assumes a place in our common law of wrongful 
death . . . .157 
Though the Massachusetts wrongful death statute and the loss of 
chance doctrine were arguably in conflict, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court interpreted the statute to implicitly incorporate a 
loss of chance claim because “claims for loss of chance . . . are 
sufficiently akin to wrongful death claims as to be cognizable under 
the wrongful death statute.”158 
Massachusetts’s and Minnesota’s wrongful death statutes are 
similarly worded as both require a defendant’s negligence or 
conduct to “cause[] the death of a person” in order to bring a 
wrongful death action.159 The states also took similar paths in 
creating their wrongful death statutes. Massachusetts, during 
colonial times, allowed for wrongful death claims at common law, 
but like Minnesota, after Baker v. Bolton was decided in 1808,160 it 
embraced the holding that no cause of action for wrongful death 
existed apart from statute.161 However, in Gaudette v. Webb, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court acknowledged there was a common 
law wrongful death action, and held that the wrongful death statute 
merely provided the procedural requirements to bring such a 
claim.162 On the other hand, Minnesota has never explicitly 
acknowledged the existence of a common law wrongful death 
 
 157.  Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 837–38. 
 158.  Id. at 837. 
 159.  Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (2013) (West, Westlaw through 
Ch. 38 of the 2014 2nd Ann. Sess.) (imposing liability on anyone who “by his 
negligence causes the death of a person”), with MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2012) 
(“When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person . . . the 
trustee appointed . . . may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have 
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the wrongful 
act or omission.”). 
 160.  See supra Part II.A. (explaining the significance of Baker v. Bolton on U.S. 
law). 
 161.  See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835–36; supra Part II; see, e.g., Carey v. 
Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1848) (holding the death of a person is not proper 
grounds for an action for damages). 
 162.  284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972). 
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action, and has always held the cause of action was a creature of 
statute.163 
Despite these differences, Minnesota could still follow a similar 
path, and interpret its wrongful death statute to implicitly 
incorporate a loss of chance claim, because the two claims are 
“sufficiently akin” to one another.164 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
found the Matsuyama opinion very persuasive, as evidenced by its 
heavy reliance on the opinion throughout its analysis in Dickhoff.165 
In addition, for practical reasons, this could be the best route for 
Minnesota courts to take, because it would avoid drawing an 
arbitrary line between plaintiffs166 and would be a relatively “easy” 
solution compared to a legislative amendment of the statute.167 
Once the courts have interpreted loss of chance as properly 
falling within the ambit of the wrongful death statute, the courts 
could decide loss of chance would be best settled as a matter of 
fault apportionment. For example, on the special verdict form the 
court could ask the jury to determine whether the physician was 
negligent in his or her diagnosis or treatment of the decedent. If 
answered in the affirmative, the next question would be what share 
of the fault the physician bore for the decedent’s death. This would 
 
 163.  See supra Part II. 
 164.  See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 837. 
 165.  See Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013) 
(citing to the Matsuyama decision twelve times as the court explained the loss of 
chance doctrine and its implications). 
 166.  The arbitrary line would be drawn between plaintiffs who have suffered a 
loss of chance of survival but live long enough to bring the action to completion, 
and plaintiffs who suffered a loss of chance of survival but unfortunately do not 
survive their illnesses long enough to bring a claim or do not survive the trial. 
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision in Dickhoff on certain 
policy rationales––namely, that it was harsh and arbitrary to draw a line between 
plaintiffs with a pre-negligence chance of survival of fifty-one percent (who were 
able to recover full damages) and plaintiffs with a pre-negligence chance of 
survival of forty-nine percent or lower (who were denied a loss of chance 
recovery)––it does not seem likely that the court would draw another arbitrary line 
in the application of the loss of chance doctrine. 
 167.  It would be easy in the sense that the court must simply interpret the 
words of the legislature in the wrongful death statute, and it would not require the 
legislature to embark on the process of amending the statute. Additionally, if the 
legislature did not intend to incorporate the loss of chance claims in the wrongful 
death statute, it could amend the wrongful death statute and overturn the court’s 
ruling. This would be similar to what the Michigan and South Dakota legislatures 
did after the high court established loss of chance. 
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be compared to the portion of the ‘fault’ attributable to the 
underlying disease running its natural course––which would 
amount to the percentage of fault attributable to the defendant in 
the loss of chance claim.168 This process would be a fairly effortless 
way of incorporating the loss of chance doctrine within Minnesota’s 
existing framework.169 
4. Survivorship Actions: The Missouri Approach 
There are meritorious arguments suggesting the Minnesota 
Legislature could adopt a survival statute, which would allow for a 
survivorship action to be brought by family members of the 
decedent. This would create a distinction between a traditional 
wrongful death claim and recovery under loss of chance.170 The 
wrongful death claims would be left for the specific instances where 
a survivor is recovering for his or her own loss (and not the 
decedent’s loss).171 A good example of how this would function is 
set out by Missouri’s approach to loss of chance. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the loss of chance 
doctrine in Wollen v. DePaul Health Center.172 In Wollen, the plaintiff 
brought a wrongful death action in accordance with Missouri’s 
wrongful death statute173 and argued her husband would not have 
passed away if he had been correctly diagnosed and given the 
appropriate treatment.174 Specifically, the plaintiff contended if the 
defendants would have properly diagnosed and treated the 
decedent, he would have “‘had a thirty percent chance . . . of 
survival and cure.’”175 
 
 168.  This suggested framework for apportionment parallels the existing jury 
instructions for negligence and comparative fault. See, e.g., 4 STEENSON & KNAPP, 
supra note 2, § 28.90. See also Mahoney v. Podolnick, 773 A.2d 1102, 1103–04 (N.J. 
2001) (comparing the doctor’s fault to the “fault” of the underlying disease in a 
loss of chance claim). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976) (applying 
Ohio law). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. 1992). 
 173.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2nd Reg. 
Sess.). 
 174.  Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 682. 
 175.  Id. 
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The court concluded that a patient suffers harm when a doctor 
fails to diagnose or adequately treat a serious injury or disease; just 
as the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded in Dickhoff, this loss of 
chance of recovery is a separately compensable harm.176 Also like 
Minnesota, the Missouri court adopted a proportional damage 
calculation.177 Despite recognizing and adopting a recovery based 
on loss of chance, the Missouri Supreme Court remanded the 
plaintiff’s case back to the trial court so that the plaintiff could 
amend her petition and sue under the state’s survivorship statute178 
instead of the wrongful death statute.179 The court explained the 
fundamental difference between the two statutes is that the 
“survivorship statute applies when the injury alleged did not cause 
death, and the wrongful death statute applies when the injury did 
cause death.”180 
In other words, to bring an action under the wrongful death 
statute, the plaintiff must be able to prove the death of the 
decedent was the result of the negligence of the tortfeasors.181 In a 
loss of chance claim, the plaintiff must rely on the patient’s 
statistical chance of recovery in making his or her claim, and argue 
this chance would not have been lost if the defendant would have 
properly diagnosed the patient.182 However, it cannot be argued 
based on this statistical measurement that the decedent would have 
survived had he or she been properly diagnosed.183 This cannot be 
argued because the plaintiff is not armed with this information, 
and even if there is medical certainty regarding the chance that the 
patient would have survived his or her injuries, this does not inform 
 
 176.  Id. at 684. In an interesting analogy, the Missouri Supreme Court 
described the harm in a loss of chance action as being similar to a scenario where 
a person was forced to choose between three unmarked doors, two of which 
contained death and the last containing life. Id. A doctor “who deprived a patient 
of this opportunity [to choose], even though only a one-third chance, would have 
caused her real harm.” Id. 
 177.  Id. at 684 n.2. Missouri instructs the jury to find the value of the lost life 
and in a percentage measurement, the exact chance of recovery lost. The court 
takes these numbers and multiplies them together to determine the net value of 
the damage award. 
 178.  MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020 (2013) (Westlaw). 
 179.  Id. § 537.080 (Westlaw); Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685. 
 180.  Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685. 
 181.  MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (Westlaw); Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685. 
 182.  Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685. 
 183.  Id. 
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the court whether this particular patient died (or will die) as a 
result of the defendant’s negligence.184 Therefore, it is impossible 
to prove the decedent’s death resulted from the defendant’s failure 
to properly diagnose and treat, and the plaintiff is precluded from 
bringing an action under the wrongful death statute.185 
Instead, the plaintiff is able to bring a claim under Missouri’s 
survivorship statute, which states: 
Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those 
resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health 
or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by 
reason of his death . . . such a cause of action shall survive 
to the personal representative of such injured party, and 
against the person . . . liable for such injuries . . . and the 
measure of damages shall be the same as if such death or 
deaths had not occurred.186 
This provision allows the personal representative to bring a loss of 
chance claim under the same statute regardless of whether the 
patient ultimately dies from his or her disease.187 Because the 
measure of damages is the same whether the patient is alive or 
dead, all patients seeking to recover under loss of chance can 
receive the same recovery, and their actions do not have to be 
transitioned into wrongful death claims upon the patient’s death.188 
Missouri’s survivorship statute stands in stark contrast to the 
Minnesota wrongful death statute because the latter draws a bright 
dividing line between wrongful death actions and personal injury 
claims, and it allows for the recovery of different types of damages 
depending on whether the plaintiff dies during the cause of 
action.189 In fact, under the present circumstances in Minnesota, a 
patient who brings a loss of chance claim against a defendant likely 
could collect damages for pain and suffering, past and future 
economic loss, and past and future medical expenses that were the 
 
 184.  Id. at 685–86. 
 185.  Id. at 686. 
 186.  MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020(1) (Westlaw). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  See id. 
 189.  Tiedeken v. Tiedeken, 363 N.W.2d 909, 910–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(citing Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 
1982)) (“A wrongful death claim, unlike a claim for personal injuries does not 
include compensation for pain and suffering.”); 27 STEENSON ET AL., supra note 68, 
§ 13.13. 
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result of the physician’s negligence. In contrast, if the patient dies 
during the process of his or her claim, the action must be 
converted into a wrongful death action, the damages available for 
the same claim would be limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by 
the next of kin from the patient’s death, and damages such as pain 
and suffering would be uncollectible.190 Missouri’s use of a 
survivorship statute to complement its wrongful death claim 
seamlessly introduces loss of chance into Missouri law and does not 
create the same inconsistencies that are currently present with the 
Minnesota wrongful death statute alone. 
VI. PREDICTIONS FOR MINNESOTA 
In the wake of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dickhoff, the State has many options regarding how it will introduce 
loss of chance into its existing legal framework. As presented by 
Part V, the legislature could abrogate191 or amend192 the wrongful 
death statute to bring harmony between the loss of chance doctrine 
and the wrongful death statute. The courts could interpret the loss 
of chance doctrine as falling within the ambit of the wrongful 
death statute193 or interpret the statute as limiting the loss of chance 
 
 190.  Outside of Missouri, many other states allow the next of kin to recover 
for a decedent’s pain and suffering. See, e.g., Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying federal common law); Rewis v. United States, 536 
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying New Mexico law); Williams v. Bay Hosp., 471 
So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (illustrating Florida has survivorship actions 
similar to those in Missouri that allow for pain and suffering damages to be 
collected by next of kin); Mahoney v. Podolnick, 773 A.2d 1102, 1103–04 (N.J. 
2001) (awarding $50,000 for decedent’s pain and suffering in a loss of chance 
claim); Barenbrugge v. Rich, 490 N.E.2d 1368, 1374–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) 
(finding the jury could consider the suffering of a decedent who died during the 
course of a loss of chance trial); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d 467, 
476 n.26 (Okla. 1987) (holding in a loss of chance action the next of kin can 
recover for a decedent’s “mental pain and anguish”). Additionally, some states 
have survivor statutes that allow an injured party’s claim to survive even after the 
injured plaintiff has died. See, e.g., Gauthe v. Asbestos Corp., 97-656 (La. App. 5 
Cir. 11/25/97), 703 So. 2d 763 (recognizing both survival actions, which are 
ordinary tort actions filed directly by injured party, and wrongful death actions, 
which are tort actions filed by survivors of deceased injured party for their own 
pain and suffering as result of death). 
 191.  See supra Part V.D.1. 
 192.  See supra Part V.D.3. 
 193.  See supra Part V.D.3. 
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doctrine to living plaintiffs, thus avoiding the issue altogether.194 Or 
even further still, the legislature could model its jurisprudence 
after Missouri and adopt a survivorship statute to complement the 
existing wrongful death statute.195 Given the long history of 
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute and the court’s lack of clear 
direction on the issue in Dickhoff, there is no easy answer. 
However, despite the lack of clarity about what will transpire in 
Minnesota, the supreme court was supportive of allowing loss of 
chance claims to proceed via the wrongful death statute.196 In 
Dickhoff, the court stated, “under our view of the loss of chance 
doctrine, the total amount of damages recoverable is equal to the 
percentage chance of survival or cure lost, multiplied by the total 
amount of damages allowable for the death or injury [of the 
patient].”197 By discussing loss of chance in the express context of 
death, it is evident the court envisioned the loss of chance doctrine 
to apply to patients equally, regardless of whether they ultimately 
survived their condition.198 From this it can be inferred that the 
court intended to allow loss of chance claims to be brought via the 
wrongful death statute, because the statute is the sole avenue 
available to parties bringing claims on behalf of a deceased 
person.199 This decreases the options available to Minnesota, so the 
most feasible option would be for the court to adopt the 
Massachusetts approach in resolving the conflict between the 
wrongful death statute and the loss of chance doctrine. 
Alternatively, while less feasible, the better option would be for the 
Minnesota Legislature to amend the wrongful death statute and 
create clear parameters for the new doctrine and the traditional 
wrongful death action. 
It is feasible for the supreme court to adopt the Massachusetts 
approach, because the court seemed amenable to the Massa-
chusetts resolution as it was presented in Matsuyama. In fact, the 
court was so persuaded by the reasoning of this decision that it 
 
 194.  See supra Part V.D.2. 
 195.  See supra Part V.D.4. 
 196.  Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 336 (Minn. 2013). 
 197.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 198.  See id. 
 199.  MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2012) (“A cause of action arising out of an injury 
to the person dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as 
provided in section 573.02.”). 
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relied on the case to establish loss of chance in Minnesota.200 Given 
this reliance, it would make sense that the court would further rely 
on Matsuyama when it determines how to fit the loss of chance 
doctrine into the Minnesota law. 
The basic tension between the wrongful death statute and the 
loss of chance doctrine is causation.201 Wrongful death plaintiffs 
phrase their complaints in terms of causation of death because this 
is mandated by statute to bring a claim.202 However, in a loss of 
chance claim a plaintiff is not trying to recover for wrongful death, 
but rather for a family member’s loss of chance to avoid death.203 In 
response to this problem, Judge Pearson of the Washington 
Supreme Court explained that he would interpret the wrongful 
death statute as being applicable to loss of chance cases because of 
the vague meaning of the word “cause.”204 A person would be found 
to have “caused” another’s death “whenever he cause[d] a 
substantial reduction in that person’s chance of survival.”205 
In addition to the imprecise meaning of causation, it is feasible 
that the courts will interpret the wrongful death statute as allowing 
a loss of chance claim to be brought via the statute because of the 
strong policy reasons underlying the loss of chance doctrine. In 
Dickhoff, the court determined recognizing loss of chance as a 
compensable injury will advance the fundamental principles of tort 
law: deterrence and compensation.206 If the court was not 
compelled by these underlying policy rationales, it would not have 
established loss of chance in Dickhoff, and would have instead 
reasserted its holding in Fabio. Its interpretation of the wrongful 
death statute as encompassing loss of chance would further these 
 
 200.  See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 329–37 (citing to the Matsuyama decision 
twelve times as the court was explaining the loss of chance doctrine and its 
implications). 
 201.  See supra Part V.C. 
 202.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (requiring death be caused by actor’s 
negligence). 
 203.  Brennwald, supra note 135, at 786–87; see Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 336. 
 204.  Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 487 n.1 (Wash. 1983) 
(Pearson, J., concurring). 
 205.  Id. at 487. 
 206.  Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 336; see also Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 42 
(Minn. 1992) (“Tort liability seeks to compensate the injured and to deter 
wrongdoing.”). 
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policy initiatives by allowing a greater number of plaintiffs to bring 
an action.207 
However, it could be argued that this method is unattractive 
because the court cannot cleanly interpret into the statute what is 
not mentioned, and this, arguably, would be an infringement on 
the power of the legislature. However, courts are permitted to 
interpret statutes, and the Minnesota courts have interpreted state 
statutes on many occasions in the past.208 Furthermore, it is 
important to recognize that there is a procedural safeguard given 
to the legislature in these circumstances––amendment power.209 If 
the legislature believes the court erred in interpreting the wrongful 
death statute as authorizing loss of chance claims, the legislature is 
free to amend the statute to reflect its actual intent.210 Overall, 
given the relative ease of the method and the court’s reliance on 
Massachusetts’ law in establishing loss of chance, it makes sense 
that the court would follow Matsuyama’s lead and interpret the 
wrongful death statute as allowing loss of chance claims. 
While the interpretation method provided by Matsuyama 
seems to be the most feasible method of incorporating loss of 
chance into Minnesota jurisprudence, it may not be the best 
 
 207.  However, see Bushnell, supra note 8, at 21, for an argument that an 
increased number of claims may be disadvantageous to consumers. 
 208.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012) (providing factors for the court to 
consider when interpreting a statute); State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 158–59 
(Minn. 2004) (stating a court can interpret a statute when it is ambiguous or 
subject to more than one reasonable meaning); see, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. v. 
Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. 2006) (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 176.061 to hold 
a workers compensation insurer’s recovery was limited to wrongful death 
damages); Tolerton & Stetson Co. v. Ferguson, 84 Minn. 497, 88 N.W. 19 (1901) 
(interpreting statute regarding service of process for corporations). 
 209.  How a Bill Becomes Law in Minnesota, MINN. STATE LEGISLATURE, http:// 
www.leg.state.mn.us/leg/howbill.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (providing that 
amendments are adopted through a majority vote by the Minnesota Legislature). 
 210.  Compare Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990) (barring 
product defect claims by commercial buyers under any circumstances except 
where the buyer could show personal injury), with Act of June 4, 1991, ch. 352, § 2, 
1991 Minn. Laws 2792, 2792–93 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.10) (overturning 
Hapka and restoring the common law economic loss rule). See generally Daniel S. 
Kleinberger et al., Building a New Foundation: Torts, Contracts, and the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, BENCH & B. MINN. (Sept. 2000), http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar 
/2000/sep00/econ-loss.htm (explaining the back and forth between the 
Minnesota Legislature and Minnesota Supreme Court in constructing the 
economic loss doctrine). 
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method. A cleaner and more effective way of incorporating the 
doctrine would be for the legislature to amend the wrongful death 
statute to reflect the inclusion of loss of chance.211 This would allow 
a loss of chance plaintiff to receive a full recovery without drawing 
arbitrary lines based on the plaintiff surviving his or her cause of 
action.212 It would also bring a greater degree of clarity to the law, 
because the court would not simply be interpreting loss of chance 
as fitting into the causation element of the wrongful death statute. 
Instead, a plaintiff would have a distinct cause of action with clearly 
defined rules and boundaries. 
The amendment process would also provide the legislature 
with the opportunity to update Minnesota’s wrongful death statute. 
As it stands, Minnesota’s wrongful death statute still bears the 
historical influences of the common law rule, which banned next of 
kin from bringing a wrongful death action. Minnesota’s statute is 
an outlier in the way it is worded, because it expressly states that all 
causes of action die with the decedent unless explicitly saved by 
statute.213 Instead of incorporating language extinguishing all 
claims at death, most states favor a construction that more closely 
resembles Lord Campbell’s Act.214 A good example of this type of 
statute is South Carolina’s wrongful death statute, which states: 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the act, 
neglect or default is such as would, if death had not 
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an 
action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person 
who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, 
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding 
the death of the person injured . . . .215 
While Minnesota Statute section 573.02 incorporates similar 
language to that of South Carolina and other such states, it 
nevertheless is couched in the initial premise that all actions die 
with the decedent unless otherwise “brought back to life” by 
statute. This presents an extra layer of difficulty when trying to 
interpret new causes of action into the existing statutory framework 
 
 211.  See supra Part V.D.3. 
 212.  See supra Part V.D.2. 
 213.  MINN. STAT. § 573.01. 
 214.  Brennwald, supra note 135, at 786–87. 
 215.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
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and could be improved by more closely mirroring Lord Campbell’s 
Act or by adopting a survivorship statute.216 
Overall, the best response to the adoption of loss of chance 
claims in Minnesota would be for the legislature to amend the 
wrongful death statute to provide for the loss of chance doctrine. 
This could just be a minor wording change, but it would allow a 
seamless introduction of loss of chance into the existing legal 
framework, eliminate inconsistencies and arbitrary line drawing, 
dispel the mysteries regarding how loss of chance should be 
applied, and would allow plaintiffs to seek a full recovery. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Dickhoff, the court established loss of chance and, by 
holding that a patient can recover when a physician’s negligence 
causes a reduction in the patient’s chances to survive or recover 
from his or her illness, introduced a host of questions in its wake. 
Among these questions is whether a loss of chance claim can be 
brought via the wrongful death statute, or whether a decedent’s 
claim is permanently extinguished. The most feasible way for the 
court to answer this question would be to adopt the reasoning set 
out in Matsuyama and allow loss of chance claims to be brought via 
the wrongful death statute through a broad interpretation of the 
statute. However, because Minnesota appears to be an outlier in 
the way its wrongful death statute is worded, the best method in 
responding to the loss of chance doctrine is an amendment to the 
existing wrongful death statute. The legislature, through an 
amendment, could ensure loss of chance plaintiffs would be able to 
(1) obtain contingency-fee legal counsel, and (2) have clear 
parameters within which to bring a claim for relief. 
 
 216.  See supra Part V.D.4. The adoption of a survivorship statute would 
eliminate the need for future interpretation of the wrongful death statute in this 
context, and in some ways would draw cleaner lines for a loss of chance claim, 
because the action would not have to be converted upon the plaintiff’s death. 
Rather, under a survivorship statute, the same action could be brought by the 
patient (or the patient’s estate), and Minnesota would not have to try to fit loss of 
chance within the parameters of a wrongful death claim. Id. 
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